The evolution of the discipline has been evident these last thirty years. Oligopolistic theories to those taking into account informational constraints, progress has also involved the analysis methodologies competitive markets by taking into account the strategic relationship between private agents, companies or authorities responsible for these economic policies.
The vision is mostly positive, what role assigned to competition policy and the competition authority? If the distinction does not seem so obvious, is still necessary to separate the concepts. Also competition policy aims at maximizing a criterion (the rest) after observing the behavior of firms. A double objective function optimization and its neutrality, which he must exercise. This last feature is the focal point with the authority that exercises: one speaks of IAA independent administrative authority. This competition is linked to that specializes in anti-competitive practices, control of concentrations and should promote competition in a market or minimize distortions caused by markets with a small number of suppliers.
progress made, especially considering the informational imperfection which the models were shown since the early work on oligopolistic markets, have the authority to link the practice of politics. Also the authority will exercise its mission when the asymmetry with the officer subject to a policy will be as transparent as possible. The strategic interaction becomes a common thread of the new analysis, roughly authority competition becomes an actor in his own studies.
Her mission becomes broader. It's not just to regulate certain markets, but to encourage businesses to either meet the requirements of competition policy or to avoid the introduction of an intervention on the market. In addition to the competition authority has a lot more tools and instruments 20 years ago.
For example, Farrell (2003) tested the relative effectiveness of the instruments. It shows that in the case of an approval under condition (contract clauses limited asset sales), the means do not accomplish the purpose, and can even cause the opposite. The sale of assets may encourage collusion where a very small number of companies determine prices and quantities proposed to limit the attractiveness of their competitive market. For example, if two companies merge calls into question the competitive market and the authority may consider whether any other merger was not established in that market while non-competitive situation persists. Therefore encourage more companies to focus can help the consumer surplus. The effect is beneficial unless these levels are responding to collusion. Consumer surplus will then return to a level less than or equal to that ex-ante to the policy.
To these structural impacts can be countered by those more or less cyclically volatile. Contract clauses can cause a limited change in corporate behavior, easily controlled by the authority.
a more concrete example is the incentive of self-selection. The article Cosnita (2006) showed that two menus may be offered to a company. The latter shall submit a draft the IAA competition. It decides whether to validate the file by its compliance with the competitive demands of the organization or to reject it. In the first case, the authority will submit plans incentives to the company (proving it does not, in the eyes of authority, pledge to reverse the effects of policy). In the second case, no incentives are given and the project company fails. It is concluded that the phenomenon of self-selection can influence the interactions between competition authority and business strategies.
Other solutions have been suggested and led to concrete measures (Act New Economic Regulations of 2001 in France). In the case of high asymmetric information, see a cartel is not easy for the IAA. Encourage a business cartel to denounce others can be beneficial to consumer surplus. Then the company is rewarded by a whistleblower immunity to sanctions by authority or compensation. Spagnolo (2007) proposes to donate all the fines paid by companies complained immune to that. Therefore effective cartels are abolished, and those potentials are discouraged.
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